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69 
WHEN WILL RACE NO LONGER MATTER  
IN JURY SELECTION? 
Bidish Sarma*† 
We are coming upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, which made clear that our Constitu-
tion does not permit prosecutors to remove prospective jurors from the jury 
pool because of their race.1 The legal question in Batson—when, if ever, can 
governmental race discrimination in jury selection be tolerated?—was easy. 
The lingering factual question, however—when will prosecutors cease to 
discriminate on the basis of race?—has proven far more difficult to answer. 
The evidence that district attorneys still exclude minorities because of their 
race is so compelling that it is tempting to assume that race will always fac-
tor into lawyers’ decisions about whom to keep on the jury and whom to 
exclude. Yet, until the Supreme Court holds lower courts accountable when 
they fail to meaningfully enforce the protections of Batson, we cannot know 
if the law goes far enough, and race will continue to permeate jury selec-
tions. Only when the law is properly enforced will we be able to determine 
if Justice Thurgood Marshall’s observation was correct: 
The Court’s opinion also ably demonstrates the inadequacy of [requiring] 
“justice . . . sit supinely by” and be flouted in case after case before a re-
medy is available. . . . The decision today will not end the racial 
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. That 
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges en-
tirely. 
When lawyers select a jury for an upcoming criminal trial, they have 
two mechanisms to remove prospective jurors from the jury pool: cause 
challenges and peremptory strikes. Jurors can be removed for cause because 
they lack the ability to remain fair and impartial. For example, a person 
whose sibling works for the district attorney’s office may be excludable for 
cause; similarly, a person who indicates that she would never credit a police 
officer’s testimony could similarly be challenged for cause. Both prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers have an unlimited number of cause challenges 
because no biased jurors should be seated. Additionally, most states provide 
the two parties with a certain number of peremptory strikes (typically 
twelve for each party selecting jurors for a twelve-person jury). The lawyers 
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can use these strikes to exclude anyone they wish, for almost any reason. A 
party’s decision to remove a prospective juror with a peremptory strike, 
however, cannot be motivated by race.  
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court revisited its decision in Swain 
v. Alabama,2 in which the Court imposed a “crippling burden of proof” on 
those who argued that prosecutors discriminated against African American 
jurors in jury selection. Swain essentially demanded that defendants prove 
that prosecutors eliminated African Americans from juries in case after case 
before an equal protection claim would have any chance to prevail. Batson 
removed this requirement and established a three-step process to decide 
claims that a party used its peremptory challenges to intentionally discrimi-
nate on the basis of race. First, the party making the allegation must 
establish a prima facie case to support the claim. The burden is not a high 
one.3 Second, if the trial court finds a prima facie case has been made, the 
other party (whose peremptory strikes are in question) must supply a race-
neutral explanation for the strike. Third, assuming the supplied reasons are 
actually race-neutral, the trial court must then determine whether it finds 
them credible and legitimate. If it does, the strike is allowed and the juror is 
excluded from the jury pool. If the court finds the reasons given for the 
strike to be illegitimate, implausible, or non-race-neutral, the peremptory 
strike is prohibited and the juror is allowed to serve on the jury. 
Although every Supreme Court pronouncement raises some complicated 
questions at the margins, the Batson framework provides reasonable guid-
ance. Nonetheless, judges have demonstrated that they are either unable or 
unwilling to enforce it to ferret out racism in their courtrooms. According to 
Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy, a 
recent report published by the Equal Justice Initiative, “Racially biased use 
of peremptory strikes and illegal racial discrimination in jury selection re-
mains widespread, particularly in serious criminal cases and capital cases.” 
In other words, when the stakes are highest, the state is most willing to play 
fast and loose with prospective jurors’ equal protection rights. And in these 
cases, courts have often refused to intercede. Trial courts, intermediate ap-
pellate courts, and even state supreme courts have shirked their duty to take 
seriously these recurring claims of racial discrimination. Although the U.S. 
Supreme Court reassured us in Purkett v. Elem that “implausible or fantastic 
justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful 
discrimination,” that statement appears now to be aspirational, not descrip-
tive. Some recent eye-opening examples reflect the problem’s magnitude.  
In 2004—in one of the many trials in the saga of the State’s highly pub-
licized prosecution against Curtis Flowers—the trial court found no 
discrimination where the prosecutors used all fifteen of its peremptory 
strikes against African Americans and held that the prosecutors could rely 
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on things that other jurors said to justify the strike of an African American.4 
The trial court’s clearly erroneous Batson rulings led to an enormous drain 
on resources, as the Mississippi Supreme Court rightly ordered a new trial 
three years later.  
In the recent 2009 second-degree murder trial of rap artist Corey Miller, 
the state singled out African American jurors to find out if they ever listened 
to rap music. Then, when making a peremptory strike that triggered one of 
the defense lawyer’s Batson objections, the prosecutor provided as a “race-
neutral” explanation that the stricken juror was not removed because of her 
race, but because of her enjoyment of “the rap music.” Nonetheless, the trial 
court failed to identify the pretext.  
These are just two examples of judicial intransigence among hundreds 
that have arisen in trial courts across the country in the past few years, but 
they demonstrate how the judiciary can render a Supreme Court opinion 
hollow in practice. Even the Supreme Court’s 2005 opinion in Miller-El v. 
Dretke, which gave a new trial to a man convicted of murder in the 1980s, 
has not done enough to protect Batson from judicial evisceration.  
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Flowers v. State pro-
vides some weight to the counter-argument that appellate courts play a 
corrective role when trial courts falter, but the reality is that they too have 
been reluctant to enforce Batson. For example, in Dressner, a case with a 
petition for certiorari currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court botched its Batson analysis.5 Although the defen-
dant expended significant time and effort briefing its discrimination claim, 
the court buried the issue in an “unpublished appendix” to the opinion.6 
Moreover, the court approved of all of the state’s peremptory strikes even 
though seven of nine were used to exclude African Americans; the prosecu-
tor used contradictory reasons to explain the strikes; the prosecutor 
mischaracterized jurors’ answers; and the prosecutor repeatedly claimed that 
he struck African Americans because they gave answers indicating they 
would favor the state. Corey Miller’s case is on appeal in Louisiana, and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion in Dressner raises the possibility that 
the court may hold that an African-American juror’s like of “the rap music” 
is as credible a reason as the prosecutor’s astonishing claim that he removed 
an African American juror because she was likely to ignore the defense at-
torney’s plea for mercy to spare the defendant from the death penalty.  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Thaler v. Haynes—which ap-
parently limited the force of previous cases favorable to criminal 
defendants—has exacerbated appellate courts’ unwillingness to find Batson 
violations.7 Indeed, in Dressner, the Louisiana Supreme Court, which had 
been reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Snyder v. Louisiana, expressly 
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noted that Haynes proved that Snyder “left [the Batson] landscape complete-
ly unchanged.” Other courts have relied on Haynes to deny relief in federal 
habeas and state post-conviction proceedings.  
Every case presents unique facts and considerations. However, the 
dearth of recent cases in which courts have actually found racial discrimina-
tion in jury selection suggests not that such discrimination doesn’t occur, but 
that the judiciary has failed to identify and remedy it. As the Mississippi 
Supreme Court observed in Flowers, “[R]acially motivated jury selection is 
still prevalent twenty years after Batson was handed down.” Statistics col-
lected in jurisdictions across the South and compiled in A Continuing Lega-
cy suggest that prosecutors still disproportionately strike prospective African 
American jurors—sometimes at an alarming 80 percent clip. The statistics 
are so powerful that they simply cannot be fully explained on grounds that 
exclude race. 
It seems that we may be slipping back into the Swain era, when in prac-
tice prosecutors were never prevented from eliminating African Americans 
from the jury pool. As the Batson Court put it, the Swain era was one in 
which “prosecutors’ peremptory challenges [were] largely immune from 
constitutional scrutiny.” Where trial courts defer to prosecutors, no matter 
how implausible the justification for a strike, and where appellate courts 
ignore startling statistics and the differential treatment of white jurors, Bat-
son becomes toothless.  
Discrimination in jury selection touches on two recurring themes in the 
continued struggle for equal justice: (1) the exclusion of African Americans 
from integral parts of our democracy and (2) judicial indifference to the 
Equal Protection Clause’s demands. Today’s battle may not be as public as 
the hard-fought struggles to guarantee African Americans access to the bal-
lot box and integrated classrooms, but it is just as important. If the courts 
continue to allow state actors to remove 70%, 80%, or even 90% of quali-
fied African American jurors without scrutiny, the system’s legitimacy will 
be called into question. We may be left with no choice but to acknowledge 
that Justice Marshall’s warning was correct, not because Batson itself failed, 
but because we failed Batson. 
